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1. INTRODUCTION 
With the current trend of enacting "English Only" legislation 
in the United States, the rights accorded linguistic minorities are 
receiving increasing attention. This essay will briefly explore the 
bases for, and the implication of, language rights under interna-
tional human rights law. International human rights law represents 
a reasonably comprehensive body of jurisprudence that is unfamil-
iar to the vast majority of lawyers in the United States. American 
law offers an impressive range of protections for the individual but 
has its limitations with respect to the rights of linguistic minorities. 
International human rights law, however, offers a more enlightened 
and flexible approach to adjudicating language rights that is gen-
erally not discussed under traditional American constitutional doc-
trine. 
* Deputy District Attorney, Santa Clara County, California and Lecturer in law, Stanford 
Law School. Opinions expressed in this Article are solely those of the author. 
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II. LANGUAGE RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES: CURRENT 
ApPROACHES To "ENGLISH ONLY" LEGISLATION 
A. California's English Only Amendment 
The United States is experiencing a growing concern, occasion-
ally bordering on hysteria, over what many view as the erosion of 
the use of the English language. l This concern has prompted a 
number of states to enact legislation affirming the primacy of En-
glish (English Only legislation).2 California is a prominent example. 
This state has long been a destination for refugees, agrarian work-
ers, and immigrants from areas including Mexico, Central America, 
and Asia. Many non-English speakers consequently live within the 
state's borders. Principal linguistic minorities in California include 
Hispanics, Chinese, and Vietnamese. As these examples demon-
strate, language and ethnic minority groups frequently coincide. 
California voters recently passed an initiative which amended the 
state constitution to declare English the state's officiallanguage.3 Its 
stated purpose is to "preserve, protect and strengthen" the English 
language.4 
California's English Only amendment requires that the legis-
lature "take all steps necessary to insure that the role of English as 
the common language of the State of California is preserved and 
enhanced."5 No law which "diminishes or ignores the role of English 
as the common language" may be passed.6 The amendment is "not 
to supercede any of the rights guaranteed" by the state constitution.7 
Private individuals are specifically permitted to bring suit against 
1 It should be noted that languages other than English (including German and Spanish) 
historically have been granted official status in various regions of the United States. The 
non-English languages were often those of older, more established immigrants, as opposed 
to more recent settlers. For an historical overview of status of various languages in the United 
States, see Note, Language and Education Rights in the United States and Canada, 36 INT'L & 
COMPo L.Q. 903 (1987); Note, Language Minority Voting Rights and the English Language Amend-
ment, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 657 (1987). 
2 Arkansas, California, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Nebraska, Tennessee, and Virginia 
have adopted such legislation. 
• Proposition 63, commonly known as the "English Only" amendment, was passed in 
November 1986, codified at CAL. CONST. art. III, section 6. 
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the state to enforce the amendment.8 At this writing, no imple-
menting legislation has been enacted under California's English 
Only amendment. Most vulnerable to attack under this amendment 
are bilingual public education, multilingual ballots, multilingual 
emergency services and information concerning public benefits. 
Courts have not considered whether California's English Only 
amendment violates the equal protection clause of the U.S. Consti-
tution's fourteenth amendment (equal protection clause). In Guiter-
rez v. Municipal Court of the South-East Judicial District, a Los Angeles 
Municipal Court promulgated a rule requiring court employees to 
speak only English in court offices, unless the employees were trans-
lating for the public or on a lunch break. 9 Guiterrez, a bilingual 
Hispanic-American employed as deputy court clerk, challenged this 
rule. One of her duties as a clerk was to translate for the Spanish-
speaking public. 
While the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Guiterrez discussed 
the California English Only amendment, the court did not reach 
the amendment's validity under the equal protection clause. The 
Ninth Circuit rejected the appellant's argument that the Los An-
geles Court's rule was required by California's English Only amend-
ment. First, the court reasoned, the California Constitution simply 
asserts that English is the state's official language and does not 
require that English be the only language spoken. 1O The court re-
jected the contention that all government communications be in 
English since the official use of Spanish was permitted (and some-
times mandated) for official business. II In addition, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that even though an individual may be bilingual, "his 
primary language remains an important link to his ethnic culture 
and identity."12 While Guiterrez contains helpful reasoning concern-
ing the importance of language to group identity, the decision sheds 
no light on equal protection issues arising out of English Only 
legislation. 
8 Id. 
'! Guiterrez v. Municipal Court of the South-East Judicial District, 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 
1988). 
10 Id. at 1043-44. 
II Id. at 1044. 
'" Id. at 1039. It should be noted that the court's discussion of the significance oflanguage 
and national unity exemplifies a relatively enlightened perspective which recognizes that 
language and national origin are interrelated. The court remarks that, "The multicultural 
character of American society has a long and venerable history and is widely recognized as 
one of the United States' greatest strengths." Id. at 1038-39 (citation omitted). 
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B. Traditional Constitutional Analysis 
Several courts have considered the constitutionality of language 
policies in contexts outside of California's amendment. For exam-
ple, courts have considered the validity of bilingual education pro-
grams and the availability on the basis of language of a variety of 
government services. 13 Challenges to those programs have relied 
either on federal statutes or on the equal protection clause. 
The outcome of equal protection challenges depends largely 
on the determination of which tier of constitutional analysis is most 
appropriate to the group in question. The three possible tiers are 
strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and the rational basis test. To 
apply strict scrutiny, the inequality must either involve a "suspect 
classification" or a "fundamental right." The Supreme Court has 
defined suspect classifications very narrowly and allowed only two 
types of classes under this category: racial minorities and certain 
classes based on alienage. To merit strict scrutiny, the group must 
have a history of unequal treatment and disenfranchisement. 14 
A fundamental right is one "implicitly" or "explicitly" found in 
the Constitution. 15 Fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the 
Constitution include the right to free speech and to petition the 
government. "Implicit" fundamental rights include the right to vote, 
the right to privacy and the right to travel. 16 When strict scrutiny is 
applied, the statute in question is rarely upheld: the law must be 
precisely tailored to serve a compelling government interestY The 
Supreme Court generally is reluctant to expand the category of 
fundamental rights. 
If the discrimination alleged in an equal protection claim does 
not involve a fundamental right or a suspect classification, courts 
will apply a lower level of scrutiny. An intermediate standard of 
scrutiny is applied when a group is a "quasi-suspect" class or an 
interest is important, but not fundamental. Under this middle tier, 
13 See B. Piatt, Toward Domestic Recognition of a Human Right to Language, 23 Hous. L. 
REV. 885 (1986); Note, Official English': Federal Limits on Efforts to Curtail Bilingual Services in 
the States, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1345 (1987); Language Minority Voting Rights and the English 
Language Amendment, 8upra note 1; see also Comment, Cultural Pluralism, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 133 (1978); Note, The Proposed English Language Amendment: Shield or Sword? 3 YALE 
L. & POL'y REV. 519 (1985). 
14 San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,28,93 S. Ct. 1278, 
36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). 
15 [d. at 33. 
16 See id. at 35-36; see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969). 
17 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982); see also Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638. 
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the state must demonstrate that the statute is substantially related 
to a significant government interest. 18 Finally, the broadest standard 
of analysis is the rational basis test. The rational basis test will find 
state action producing discriminatory results to be constitutionally 
permissible if the action bears a rational relationship to a legitimate 
or reasonable state purpose.19 In order to strike down a law on the 
basis of racial discrimination, discriminatory intent or purpose must 
be established. This requirement of intent, however, is often diffi-
cult to satisfy.20 
To date, linguistic minorities have been accorded neither sus-
pect class status nor quasi-suspect class status for the purpose of 
affirmative entitlements.21 The discriminatory intent requirement 
compounds the difficulty of confronting discrimination against lin-
guistic minorities under the equal protection clause. Although equal 
protection holdings concerning linguistic minorities seem to apply 
a rational basis test, there is room to argue that the courts should 
apply heightened scrutiny to cases involving linguistic minority 
rights. 22 
Courts have reviewed a variety of English Only policies. In the 
private employment context, courts almost uniformly refuse to 
grant suspect classification status to linguistic minority challenges 
and have held that English Only rules do not result in discrimina-
tion. Garcia v. Gloor, for example, involved a bilingual Mexican-
American employee, born in Mexico, who challenged his employer's 
rule that employees in sales positions were to speak only English on 
thejob.23 The rule did not apply to those who did not speak English 
or to conversations during breaks. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the policy was implemented 
18 Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982). 
19 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 40; see also Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 
427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976). 
20 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 
(1977). See generally Keyes v. School District No.1. Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
21 See e.g., Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 1983) (rejected challenge 
by Hispanics to Social Security notices which were in English only), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929 
(1984); Guadalupe Organization v. Tempe Elementary School District No 3, 587 F.2d 1022, 
1927 (9th Cir. 1978) (rejected claim of Mexican-American and Native American (Yaqui) 
school children to a constitutional right to bicultural, bilingual education); Frontera v. Sindell, 
522 F.2d 1215, 1219-20 (6th Cir. 1975) (rejected challenge to civil service exams offered in 
English only); Carmona v. Sheffield, 475 F.2d 738, 739 (9th Cir. 1973) (denied plaintiff's 
right to interviewers and notices concerning unemployment insurance in Spanish). 
22 See Piatt, supra note 13; Official English': Federal Limits on Efforts to Curtail Bilingual 
Services in the States, supra note 13. 
23 Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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for non-discriminatory business reasons. The employer'S rule was 
not discriminatory as applied to Garcia because he could readily 
comply with the policy; non-compliance was a matter of choice for 
him.24 Contrasting Garcia's situation with that of someone who 
spoke only Spanish, the Fifth Circuit suggested: "To a person who 
speaks only one tongue, or a person who has difficulty using another 
language than the one spoken in his home, language might well be 
an immutable characteristic, like skin color, sex, or place ofbirth."25 
Public employment cases seem to produce similar results. In 
Frontera v. Sindell, Frontera, a Spanish-speaking carpenter applying 
for a permanent job with a municipal government, claimed that he 
failed the civil service examination because it was administered in 
English.26 He had been working for the municipality on a part-time 
basis. The parties stipulated that he was skilled as a carpenter and 
that his language abilities did not interfere with his ability to per-
form his job. Frontera requested in advance that the exam be ad-
ministered to him in Spanish. Although a commission agreed to 
translate it for him if possible, the test was given in English. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the 
fourteenth amendment does not require civil service exams to be 
conducted in Spanish for Spanish-speaking individuals.27 
The Sixth Circuit held in Frontera that the lower court should 
have applied the rational basis test rather than strict scrutiny, since 
no suspect nationality or race was involved.28 Holding that the ad-
ministration of the test in English did not discriminate against the 
plaintiff on the basis of his nationality, the Sixth Circuit noted: 
"Frontera did not have a constitutional right to public employ-
ment."29 The court justified its decision by reasoning that it would 
be too burdensome on the municipality'S limited financial resources 
to require it to provide translations for all nationalities.30 The court 
24 Garcia, 618 F.2d at 270. In Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corporation, 813 F.2d 1406 (9th 
Cir. 1987), a bilingual disc jockey alleged that his civil rights were violated on the basis of 
race and national origin when he was fired for refusing to speak English only on his radio 
program. The radio station had adopted a bilingual format for Jurado'S show to improve 
the program's ratings, but instead the ratings dropped. The station subsequently reverted to 
the original format. The Court held that in this instance the rule was not racially motivated; 
rather, it represented a valid business decision which was enforced against an employee who 
was able to comply, as was the case in Garcia. 
25 Garcia, 618 F.2d at 270. 
26 Frontera, 522 F.2d 1215. 
27 ld. at 1218. 
28ld. at 1219. 
29ld. at 1220. 
30 ld. at 1219. 
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also added that English is the national language of the United States 
and stated that there is a national interest in having English as a 
common language.31 
Other cases hold that the relationship between public benefits 
and language rights generally does not warrant heightened scrutiny. 
In Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, for example, the plaintiffs were Hispanics 
who spoke only limited English.32 They contended that letters deny-
ing them their claims for supplementary social security and disabil-
ity benefits written only in English violated their fourteenth amend-
ment rights. These letters included notices of the plaintiffs' rights 
to appeal and to obtain a hearing. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' contentions, 
remarking that social security benefits are not fundamental entitle-
ments.33 The court reasoned that although Hispanics may be a 
suspect class for equal protection analysis, the Soberal-Perez plaintiffs 
failed to allege improper classification as an ethnic group.34 The 
Second Circuit stated: "A classification is implicitly made, but it is 
on the basis of language, i.e., English-speaking versus non-English-
speaking individuals, and not on the basis of race, religion, or 
national origin. Language, by itself, does not identify members of 
a suspect class. "35 The court further explained that while facially 
neutral statutes or conduct may violate the fourteenth amendment, 
there must be a showing of discriminatory intent against a suspect 
class. The court found that the Soberal-Perez plaintiffs made no such 
showing.36 
In Guadalupe Organization, Inc. v. Tempe Elementary School District 
No.3, public elementary school children of Mexican-American and 
Native American (Yaqui) descent brought suit to compel their school 
district to provide bilingual and bicultural education for the non-
English-speaking students.37 The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit applied the rational basis test to the claim.38 
Citing San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,39 the Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that while education is an important interest, it is 
31 [d. at 1220. 
32 Soberal-Perez, 717 F.2d 36. 
33 [d. at 41. 
34 [d. 
35 [d. (citation omitted). 
36 [d. at 42. 
37 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1978). 
3. Guadalupe, 587 F.2d at 1026. 
3g411 u.s. 1,35(1973). 
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not a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution.40 The 
Guadalupe court concluded that the equal protection clause does not 
require the state to provide bicultural or bilingual education.41 The 
court further held that the school district met its constitutional 
obligations by adopting measures "to cure existing language defi-
ciencies of non-English-speaking students."42 According to the 
Guadalupe court, the school's program did not "fail 'to provide each 
child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills nec-
essary for the enjoyment of rights of speech and of full participation 
in the political process."'43 The court asserted that linguistic and 
cultural diversity, despite their occasional advantages, are actually 
detrimental to a nation.44 It nonetheless concluded that bilingual 
and bicultural education are issues to be decided on a local level 
and are neither mandated nor prohibited by the Constitution.45 
Some support for heightened scrutiny of linguistic minority 
rights issues is nonetheless found in a recent Ninth Circuit case 
involving voting procedures. In Olagues v. Russoniello, the United 
States Attorney's office conducted an investigation of possible voter 
fraud regarding foreign-born voters who requested bilingual bal-
lots.46 The voters wished to have such ballots provided in counties 
where other voting materials were already available in Spanish and 
Chinese pursuant to federallawY The Ninth Circuit ruled that the 
U.S. Attorney's investigation specifically targeted Chinese and His-
panic immigrants and held that the district court should have ac-
corded the plaintiffs suspect classification.48 The Court of Appeals 
reasoned that in passing legislation mandating bilingual ballots, 
Congress recognized that discrimination against linguistic minorities 
Id. 
40 Guadalupe, 587 F.2d at 1026. 
41Id. at 1027. 
42Id. at 1026-27. 
43Id. at 1027. 
44 Id. The court stated: 
Linguistic and cultural diversity within the nation-state, whatever may be its advan-
tages from time to time, can restrict the scope of the fundamental compact. Diversity 
limits unity. Effective action by the nation-state rises to its peak of strength only 
when it is in response to aspirations unreservedly shared by each constituent cultural 
and language group. As affection which a culture or group bears toward a particular 
aspiration abates, and as the scope of sharing diminishes, the strength of the nation-
state's government wanes. 
45Id. 
46 Olagues v. Russoniello, 797 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1986). 
47Id. 
4BId. at 1521. 
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exists.49 The court added that, "an individual's primary language 
skill generally flows from his or her national origin."50 The court 
noted, however, that while immutability may indicate suspect clas-
sification, it is not determinative. 51 
The Ninth Circuit distinguished Olagues from cases denying 
suspect classification to linguistic minorities by stating that the plain-
tiffs in those cases sought only to establish classifications on the basis 
of an individual's ability to speak English, which is a constitutionally 
neutral attribute.52 The court reasoned that the Olagues plaintiffs, 
by contrast, alleged a more specific, non-neutral classification of 
Chinese-speaking and Spanish-speaking immigrants.53 The Court 
of Appeals stated: "while a non-English-speaking classification is 
facially neutral with respect to ethnic group classification, the clas-
sification challenged here is not, because for all practical purposes, 
it is a classification based on race and national origin."54 The court 
concluded: "Therefore, we hold that the three characteristics, i.e., 
foreign-born voter, recently-registered voter, and bilingual ballot 
voter, taken together in the instant case form a class that has the 
traditional indicia of a suspect classification based on race and na-
tional origin."55 
The bases of courts' reasoning in cases addressing the rights of 
linguistic minorities are not always evident. It appears, however, 
that courts examine the extent to which these cases also involve 
fundamental constitutional rights in order to determine what level 
of scrutiny to apply. Courts seem least concerned with English Only 
rules in the private business context, as illustrated in Garcia. Courts 
similarly recognize no fundamental constitutional right to public 
employment and benefits, leading the Frontera and Soberal-Perez 
courts to deny heightened scrutiny to linguistic minority rights. 
While bilingual education appears to receive a closer examination 
in Guadalupe, education is not a fundamental right and it conse-
quently does not receive strict scrutiny. Courts seem to accord 
heightened protection to minority language groups only when a 
fundamental right, such as the right to vote inOlagues, is also at 
stake. If a fundamental right is at stake, however, strict scrutiny is 
49Id. at 1520. 
50Id. 
51Id. 
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independently triggered. In sum, current U.S. constitutional anal-
ysis does not accord strict scrutiny to state action affecting linguistic 
minorities. 
While traditional fourteenth amendment analysis has often 
been used to combat inequalities and to protect minority interests 
in the United States, its application in the context of linguistic 
minorities is limited. This limitation is caused in part by the rela-
tively inflexible nature of the labels and concepts upon which equal 
protection analysis relies. Courts have applied these inflexible stan-
dards because traditional doctrine dictates that fourteenth amend-
ment issues be examined under the rubric of tiers of scrutiny. 
Reliance solely on such a mechanically applied legal doctrine, how-
ever, obscures and diminishes important underlying concerns. 
Language issues are of great importance to intra-societal com-
munication and to the identity of each individual within a society. 
Recent English Only developments jeopardize the ability of non-
English-speaking citizens and residents of the United States to gain 
access to basic governmental services such as education, welfare, 
emergency medical services, and voting procedures. Given the low 
economic status of many members of linguistic minority groups and 
their consequent reliance upon government services, official lan-
guage policies will inevitably cause some individuals to suffer great 
hardship. Recognition of increased protections for linguistic minor-
ities can significantly enhance the ability of these minorities to main-
tain their various cultural heritages. A group's cultural and linguistic 
identity may be seen as important not only to the individuals directly 
concerned, but also to the cultural heritage of the entire popula-
tion.56 
III. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND LANGUAGE RIGHTS 
International human rights instruments including the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration),57 the In-
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights),58 and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant on 
56 Piatt, supra note 13; McDougall, Lasswell & Chen, Freedom from Discrimination in Choice 
of Language and International Human Rights, So. ILL. U. L.J. (1976); Cultural Pluralism, supra 
note 13. 
57 Adopted and proclaimed by G.A. Res. 217 A (III) of 10 Dec. 1948. 
58 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by G.A. Res. 2200 A 
(XXI) of 16 Dec. 1966. Article 2(2) contains its non-discrimination clause. 
1989] LANGUAGE RIGHTS IN UNITED STATES 25 
Civil and Political Rights)59 emphasize a range of fundamental val-
ues against which the validity of measures such as California's En-
glish Only amendment can be assessed. While in some respects the 
international instruments reflect traditional American conceptions 
of rights, they also introduce conceptual elements that are absent 
from the comparatively limited frame of reference of constitutional 
discourse in the United States. 
Many human rights instruments were written in the aftermath 
of the two world wars. During this time, national borders were 
dramatically re-drawn and the world sought to prevent a recurrence 
of the wholesale slaughter of the European Jewish population dur-
ing World War II. Protecting existing cultures and minorities was 
consequently of great general concern. Other treaties recognizing 
human rights were written in the 1960's, during the period of 
decolonization, when cultural imperialism (including the colonizing 
powers' imposition of their language on indigenous populations) 
was widely condemned. Given these contexts, it is not surprising 
that international human rights instruments reflect broader con-
cerns, especially with respect to cultural pluralism, than those en-
shrined in the United States Constitution. While the United States 
is proud of its history of pluralism, American legal discourse never-
theless stresses the concept of a homogenous, non-discriminatory 
society of individuals, while minimizing the rights enjoyed by sub-
societal groups such as linguistic minorities. 
A. Language as a Fundamental Right 
Unlike the U.S. Constitution the principal human rights instru-
ments include language as a classification equally as fundamental 
as race, religion, and gender in their "non-discrimination clauses." 
These clauses are the functional equivalents of the fourteenth 
amendment to the United States Constitution. The Universal Dec-
laration, for example, states: "Everyone is entitled to all the rights 
and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of 
any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status."60 Since it is a basic rule of construction that different clauses 
of an instrument are read together, no right provided for in these 
human rights agreements consequently may be denied on the basis 
59 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 57, Article 2. 
6°Id. 
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of language. Other provisions similarly recognize language as a 
fundamental right, such as Article 26 of the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights: 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without 
any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this 
respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee 
to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimi-
nation on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, reli-
gion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, prop-
erty or other birth status.61 
By considering language rights as fundamental, these human rights 
instruments could be understood, in United States constitutional 
terms, to define linguistic minorities as a suspect class.52 
Language rights nonetheless raise a range of complicated issues 
in this context. The principle of non-discrimination is basic to Amer-
ican constitutional law and to international human rights law. In a 
pluralistic society, however, the notion that individuals are entitled 
to equal treatment is complicated by the fact that certain minority 
groups may legitimately claim that they are entitled to differential 
treatment in order to preserve their collective identity. While dif-
ferential treatment, such as education in a minority language, may 
satisfy significant needs of the group, it may violate the principle of 
non-discrimination. 53 The tension between these potentially conflict-
ing concerns may be difficult to resolve, depending on factors 
unique to each situation.54 
B. What Is a Linguistic Minority? 
Article 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 
27) specifically addresses the rights of linguistic minorities. Article 
27 provides: "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be 
denied the right, in community with the other members of their 
61 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 58, Article 26. 
62 In addition to these provisions, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights has 
established an open-ended working group to consider the drafting of a Declaration on the 
Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. See 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.411987/32 (1987) and E/CN.4/1986/43 (1986). Since this Declaration is cur-
rently incomplete and in draft form, the discussion will focus on the Covenants. 
63 See V. VAN DYKE, HUMAN RIGHTS, ETHNICITY AND DISCRIMINATION (1985); Brown v. 
Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (which prohibits separate but equal 
facilities). 
64 VAN DYKE, supra note 63, at 50. See generally Cultural Pluralism, supra note 13. 
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group to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own 
religion, or to use their own language."65 While this provision af-
firms the existence and rights of linguistic minorities, which are not 
acknowledged under United States domestic law, it leaves open the 
definition of linguistic minorities. 
1. Definition of a Minority 
The United Nations has long wrestled with the meaning of the 
term "minority" and has yet to settle on a specific definition. In fact, 
the Commission on Human Rights did not define the term before 
it established the Sub-Commission on the Protection of Minorities 
and Prevention of Discrimination (Sub-Commission).66 In the 
1950's, the Sub-Commission made several unsuccessful attempts to 
define a minority, but the Commission on Human Rights never 
accepted any of the proposed definitions.67 
In 1971, the Sub-Commission appointed Francesco Capotorti 
as Special Rapporteur to examine Article 27 in detai1.68 In his study 
on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Lin-
guistic Minorities (Capotorti study), Capotorti provided the follow-
ing definition of a minority: 
A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a 
State, in a non-dominant position, whose members-being na-
tionals of the State-possess ethnic, religious or linguistic char-
acteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and 
show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards 
preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.69 
The Capotorti study is comprehensive and detailed, but no action 
was taken to endorse this proposed definition. 
In 1984, the Commission on Human Rights requested that the 
Sub-Commission define a minority.70 Special Rapporteur Jules 
Deschenes consequently examined the question again and re-
sponded with a report to the Sub-Commission entitled "Proposal 
65 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 58, Article 27. 
66 Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minor-
ities, by Special Rapporteur Francesco Capotorti [hereinafter Capotorti], U.N. Doc. E/CN.41 
Sub.2/384/Rev. 1, para. 561. 
67 United Nations Action in the Field of Human Rights at 211, U.N. Doc. ST/HRl2/Rev. 2, 
U.N. Sales No. E.83.XIV.2 (1983) [hereinafter UN Action]. 
68 UN Action, supra note 66, at 211. 
69 Capotorti, supra note 65, para. 568. 
70 U.N. Doc. E/CN.411984177 (1984), Com'n on Human Rights Res. 1984/62 (1984). 
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concerning a definition of the term 'minority."'7l Deschenes sug-
gested that a minority be defined as follows: 
A group of citizens of a State, endowed with ethnic, religious 
or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the ma-
jority of the population, having a sense of solidarity with one 
another, motivated, if only implicitly, by a collective will to sur-
vive and whose aim is to achieve equality with the majority in 
fact and in law.72 
While the Deschenes proposal was discussed by the Sub-Commis-
sion, no final conclusion was drawn. Thus, after several decades of 
debate, the United Nations has yet to accept any single definition 
of a minority. Although a single definition would facilitate inter-
pretation and implementation of the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the absence of precise agreement is by no means fatal to the 
application of Article 27 and other relevant provisions. 
2. Existence of Linguistic and Other Minorities 
Article 27 applies only to "States in which ethnic religious or 
linguistic minorities exist." This wording suggests that if no minority 
groups are recognized, no rights attach.73 According to this inter-
pretation, the state has the final say in determining which groups 
constitute a minority for purposes of Article 27. In some situations 
a state may deny the existence of a minority group, while certain 
individuals within that state believe that they constitute a minority 
that merits protection. According to the Capotorti study, a state has 
the duty to comply with Article 27 whenever there is "objective" 
proof of the existence of a minority group.74 In any event, it is clear 
that the state does not have unfettered discretion in determining 
whether or not a group constitutes a protected minority. As in all 
matters arising out of the interpretation of the Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, it is the international community, specifically 
in the form of the Human Rights Committee, which must determine 
whether or not a state is complying with its obligations. 
71 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/31 (1985), by Special Rapporteur Jules Deschenes [hereinafter 
Deschenes]. 
72 Deschenes, supra note 70, para. 181. 
73 France, for example, has stated that "Article 27 is not applicable so far as the Republic 
is concerned." Human Rights, International Instruments, Signatures, Ratifications, Accession, etc. at 
50 (1 July 1982), U.N. Doc. ST/HRl4/Rev. 4 (1982). See Minorities and Human Rights Law, 
Report No. 73, by Minority Rights Group at 7. 
74 Capotorti, supra note 65, para. 570. 
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Article 27 protects only ethnic, religious, and linguistic minority 
groups. Other minorities subject to discrimination, such as political 
groups or social classes, are not protected under Article 27. To the 
extent that ethnic, religious and linguistic classifications are fairly 
stable and identifiable, membership in these groups may be readily 
distinguishable from the remainder of the population. In regions 
such as the Middle East, however, ethnic, religious and linguistic 
classifications may be inextricably intertwined with non-protected 
political and national groups, thus obscuring these Article 27 dis-
tinctions. 
Countries have adopted a variety of policies recognizing the 
existence of linguistic minorities with respect to the operation of 
the government and legal system, schools, the media and other 
matters. 75 Some states elevate several or all languages to the status 
of "official languages" at the national level. Other countries use a 
decentralized approach which allows for one official language, but 
grants official or elevated status to other languages on a regional 
or local level. Finally, some nations, like the United States, recognize 
only one language regardless of the size of linguistic minority 
groups within their borders. 
a. Non-Dominant Position 
There are two aspects to the non-dominant status of a minority 
group: a threshold number of group members and the relative 
position of power that the group enjoys. Both the Capotorti and 
the Deschenes studies require that the members of a group must 
total less than half of a state's population in order to be a minority. 
Article 27 may also apply when there are a number of ethnic, 
religious, and linguistic groups of approximately the same size in a 
country.76 A numerical threshold provides an ostensibly objective 
means to identify the existence of a linguistic minority. Given a 
limited availability of public resources, however, most governments 
would probably require a minimum group size as a prerequisite to 
granting protections to members of a linguistic minority.77 
75Id. para. 429-521; V AN DYKE, supra note 62, chapter 2; Minorities and Human Rights 
Law, supra note 72, at 9-1l. 
76 Capotorti, supra note 65, para. 566. 
77 This requirement of a minimal number of individuals in order to receive certain 
benefits also is reflected in United States constitutional law, for example in Lau v. Nichols, 
414 U.S. 563 (1974). Lau concerned the failure of the San Francisco school system to teach 
English to about 1800 (out of 2800) Chinese-speaking students. Justice Douglas, writing for 
the Court, held that the school was required to take affirmative steps to provide some 
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The question remains as to how to determine the mmlmum 
group threshold number in any given context. That number may 
be, at least in part, a function of the nature of the protections at 
stake or a function of the expense of providing such protections. 
The geographic distribution of group members may also playa role 
in calculating a numerical threshold for linguistic minority protec-
tions. 78 As a practical matter, it is more likely that a linguistic mi-
nority will be recognized and accorded protection if group members 
are concentrated geographically rather than dispersed throughout 
the population. It is not entirely satisfactory, however, that the 
protection of fundamental rights should be dependent upon the 
group's success in concentrating its members in specific regions. 
The requirement of a numerical minimum alone suggests that 
in South Africa (to cite an obvious example), the black population, 
which constitutes a numerical majority, would not enjoy safeguards 
under Article 27. Most definitions of a minority, however, also 
provide that the minority group be in a "non-dominant position." 
This wording suggests that the group must not be in a position of 
power economically, politically, or otherwise. Thus, a small ruling 
class controlling an oppressed majority apparently would not qualify 
for Article 27 protections. 79 Once again, in some situations it may 
be difficult to determine if a group is sufficiently oppressed to meet 
this requirement. 
b. Legal Status 
While Article 27 refers only to "persons," both the Capotorti 
and the Deschenes studies restrict their definitions to individuals 
who are "nationals" or "citizens." Aliens, refugees, and other non-
nationals therefore are completely precluded from consideration. 
The Deschenes study, for example, explains that non-citizens should 
not be considered as minorities since a state's primary duty is to its 
assistance to the students. It should be noted that Douglas based his ruling on federal statutes 
such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and HEW regulations rather than on the equal protection 
clause of the Constitution. In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun commented that 
unless the situation concerned a "substantial" number of students, the Lau holding should 
not be regarded as "conclusive:" "For me, numbers are at the heart of this case .... " 414 
U.S. at 572 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
78 See discussion by V AN DYKE, supra note 62, at 24-30 concerning Belgium, including 
Case Relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of language in education in Belgium 
(Merits), 1968 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTs. (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights) 832. 
79 Capotorti, supra note 65, para. 566. But see Deschenes, supra note 70, at para. 78-88, 
in which he concludes that a strict definition of a minority must be used. 
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citizens.8o Under this approach, it appears that a group of aliens 
would have to wait until its members attain citizenship before it is 
granted any rights, even if such a group shares linguistic, ethnic, 
and religious background with others who are nationals protected 
as a minority. 
c. Group Identity 
A minority must also possess common ethnic, linguistic or re-
ligious traits and must manifest some degree of group "solidarity," 
either explicitly or implicitly. Maintenance of one's language rep-
resents an easily identifiable, objective indication of a group's sub-
jective desire to preserve its cultural heritage.81 The Deschenes 
study notes that a group seeking minority status must demonstrate 
a "collective will to survive,"82 adding that the group must wish to 
achieve de jure and de facto equality with the rest of the population.83 
A linguistic minority with no interest in preserving its heritage most 
likely will be assimilated into the dominant culture, and thus will 
not need protection under Article 27. The requirement that a group 
should desire to maintain its characteristics, however, assumes that 
a minority will be able to survive as a group if it wishes to do so. 
What may be perceived as a group's "indifference" to its language 
or heritage may actually reflect other conditions in the country such 
as forced assimilation, a dispersed minority population or a lack of 
political influence.84 
d. Indigenous Populations 
The unique historical situation of indigenous populations also 
raises the question of whether these populations should be granted 
protections comparable to or even greater than protections enjoyed 
by non-indigenous minority groups. While the issues confronting 
"traditional" minorities and indigenous populations are often sim-
ilar, a growing body of domestic and international law addresses 
so Deschenes, supra note 70, at para. 44; but see id. at para. 46. 
SI See generally Capotorti, supra note 65, at para. 244-271. 
S2 Deschenes, supra note 70, at para. 75. 
Sg/d. at para. 171. 
S4 See Sohn, The Rights of Minorities, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 279-80 (L. 
Henkin ed. 1981); Dinstein, Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities, 25 INT'L & COMPo 
L.Q. 102, 104 (1976). 
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issues specific to indigenous peoples.85 Indigenous populations have 
been defined by Special Rapporteur Martinez-Cobo in his report to 
the Sub-Commission on Indigenous Populations: 
Indigenous commumtIes, peoples and nations are those 
which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-
colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider 
themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now pre-
vailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at 
present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to 
preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their an-
cestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their 
continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own 
cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.86 
Despite the parallels between the definitions of minorities and in-
digenous populations, the Deschenes study points out that certain 
characteristics of the two groups are not identical and concludes 
that indigenous populations should not be considered as minority 
groups.87 Thus, according to the Deschenes study, neither indige-
nous peoples that pre-date the "dominant" societal power nor the 
most recent non-citizen arrivals in a state are to be considered as 
minorities. 
Moreover, a number of indigenous peoples themselves have 
indicated that they do not wish to be categorized as minorities.88 
Indigenous groups do not deny that they need protection, but 
rather assert that they are different and face distinct problems. 
These groups consequently argue that they merit separate treat-
ment and should not be lumped in the same category as minorities . 
. While the wishes of indigenous populations should be respected, 
the implications of this approach are unclear. One possible conse-
quence of this view espoused by indigenous groups could be a new 
international instrument dealing exclusively with the rights of in-
85 The International Labour Organization'S Indigenous and Tribal Populations Conven-
tion of 1957, ILO Convention 107, which is currently under revision, illustrates that indig-
enous populations have often been treated as distinct from other minority groups. 
86 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.21l983/211Add.8. para. 379 (1983). Martinez-Coho further ex-
plains that: "On an individual basis, an indigenous person is one who belongs to these 
indigenous populations through self-identification as indigenous (group consciousness) and 
is recognized and accepted by these populations as one of its members (acceptance by the 
group)." U.N. Doc. E/CN/Sub.21l983/211Add.8, para. 381 (1983). 
87 Deschenes, supra note 70, para. 24-38. 
88 See U.N. Doc. E/CN.41 Sub.2/1984/20, at para. 104 (1984); Deschenes, supra note 70, 
para. 32-34. 
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digenous populations.89 Indeed, for several years the Sub-Com mis-
sion's Working Group on Indigenous Populations has been drafting 
a Declaration of Principles concerning the rights of indigenous 
populations.90 While this alternative may represent a politically pal-
atable solution, it does little for other minority groups. 
e. Individual versus Collective Rights 
Historically, international human rights law has focused on the 
protection of individual rights. Examples of individual rights in-
clude the right to privacy, freedom of thought, and security of the 
person. Collective rights were subsequently recognized in the con-
text of the rights of minorities.9! Collective rights include the right 
to self-determination, the right to utilize natural resources, and 
"new" rights such as the right to development.92 The distinction 
between individual and collective or group rights is frequently 
made.93 Deschenes concludes that the emphasis should be placed 
on the individual, not the group.94 The two categories, however, 
may actually merge or overlap, as in the case of the right of asso-
ciation which is ostensibly an individual right but only has real 
significance when exercised by a group. The concept of a minority 
in international human rights law reveals the interplay between 
linguistic minority groups and their individual members. While 
specific protections appear to be enjoyed by individuals, without the 
context of an identifiable minority group the rights do not exist. 
C. Application of Language Rights 
The extent to which a state chooses to acknowledge rights of 
linguistic minorities affects the ability of members of these minority 
groups to fully participate in societal opportunities, such as educa-
tion, and to preserve their cultural heritage. To date, neither access 
to education nor cultural preservation for linguistic minorities have 
received more than rational basis scrutiny under United States con-
89 But see J. Nordenfelt, Conventions in Crisis, II HUM. RTS. INTERNET REPORTER 60 
(WinterlSpring 1987). 
90 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.21l987/22 (1987). 
91 The rights of select minorities in fact have long been recognized by international law 
pursuant to certain treaties. See Dinstein, supra note 83, at 113-15. 
92 [d. at 106-11; VAN DYKE, supra note 62, at 14-16. 
93 See generally Dinstein, supra note 83. 
94 According to Deschenes: "Every minority undoubtedly constitutes a group, but where 
it is a question of determining its rights, it is on the individual as a member of the minority 
that the emphasis should be placed." Descherles, supra note 70, para. 56. 
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stitutional doctrine. Yet international human rights law, developed 
against the background of an international recognition of the need 
for cultural pluralism, provides protections for linguistic minorities 
in these areas. Ratification by the United States of the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights would provide the basis for legal protections for 
language rights in the context of education and cultural preserva-
tion. If ratification is not feasible (for political or other reasons), 
these instruments should be cited in U.S. courts as sources of cus-
tomary international law.95 Finally, one may look to the Covenants 
and United Nations studies as instructive of world trends and in-
ternational norms. In any case, American lawyers should consider 
employing the approaches used in international law. 
1. Language and Education 
While the United States Supreme Court has conceded that the 
equal protection clause does apply to language in the context of 
education, it has yet to go as far as international instruments. In 
countries in which a number of languages are spoken, if linguistic 
minorities are to survive, it is vital that the various languages be 
used in the school system, especially at the primary level, since 
language is inextricably connected with education.96 In addition to 
Article 27's provisions, Article 13 of the Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights, which affirms the "right of everyone to 
education," also is relevant to linguistic minorities.97 The Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights explicitly recognizes the 
goals and underlying purposes of education: "[States] agree that 
education shall be directed to the full development of the human 
personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms."98 This word-
95 For discussions concerning the methods, merits, and status of incorporating interna-
tional human rights law in domestic courts, see, e.g., Burke, et. al., The Status of International 
Human Rights Law: An Overview, 18 TEXAN INT'L LAW J. 291 (1983); Lillich, Invoking Inter-
national Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 367 (1985); Oliver, The Treaty 
Power and National Foreign Policy as Vehicles for the Enforcement of Human Rights in the United 
States,9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 411 (1981); Schneebaum, International Law as Guarantor of Judicially-
Enforceable Rights: A Reply to Professor Oliver, 4 Hous. L. REV. 65 (1981); Symposium on Inter-
national Human Rights Law in State Courts, 18 INT'L LAWYER 59, 59-88 (1984). 
96 McDougall, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 55, at 153-57; Piatt, supra note 13; Cultural 
Pluralism, supra note 13; Capotorti, supra note 65, para. 493. 
97 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 58, at Article 13. 
9R ld. 
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ing permits discourse that is too rarely acknowledged by courts in 
the United States.99 Although equal opportunity and equal access 
are familiar concepts in domestic law, international human rights 
instruments extend them further. 
While it is easy to make the connection between language and 
education, economic and other logistical constraints may prevent 
states from providing education in each minority group's language. 
In addition, some argue that emphasis on a minority language may 
permanently handicap or isolate members of a minority group and 
consequently create a permanent underclass in society. Other forms 
of multilingual education, however, concurrently teach minority 
group language(s) and the language of the majority group. In sum, 
the complex debate concerning the relative merits of the different 
approaches to bilingual education remains unresolved. 
2. Language and Culture 
International human rights instruments, by contrast to United 
States constitutional law, recognize that language is a reflection and 
vital component of one's culture. 100 These instruments consequently 
affirm the rights of linguistic minorities, and prohibit governments 
from interfering with this aspect of an individual's identity. Article 
27, for example, states that members of linguistic and other minor-
ities "shall not be denied the right, in community with the other 
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and 
practise their own religion, or to use their own language."101 UNES-
CO's Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Co-
operation similarly states: "every people has the right and duty to 
develop its culture."102 This provision acknowledges that state in-
terference with the development of a culture is prohibited and 
further indicates that cultural groups themselves bear an affirmative 
responsibility to develop their respective identities. These interna-
99 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
100/d. (general discussion concerning importance of language and identity of individual 
and group); Piatt, supra note 13,895-99 (discussion concerning the relation between language 
and culture); Cultural Pluralism, supra note 13. 
101 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 57, Article 27. 
102 Proclaimed by the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization at its 14th session on 4 Nov. 1966, Article 1(2). Article 1(1) 
provides: "Each culture has a dignity and value which must be respected and preserved." 
Article 1(3) adds: "In their rich variety and diversity, and in the reciprocal influences they 
exert on one another, all cultures form part of the common heritage belonging to all 
mankind." 
36 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORW LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:15 
tional human rights provisions not only recognize the existence of 
diverse groups within a population, but also confirm their impor-
tance. 
In addition to prohibiting discrimination on the basis of lan-
guage, international instruments place an affirmative duty on states 
to maintain and promote cultural diversity. Article 15 of the Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right 
of everyone to take part in cultural life . . . . The steps to be 
taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve 
the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for 
the conservation, the development and the diffusion of science 
and culture. 103 
This provision thus ~xtends the protection of linguistic minorities 
further than that allowed under U.S. law: each linguistic group has 
a right to maintain its language. Each group is also encouraged to 
share its contributions to cultural diversity with the rest of society. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While American constitutional law affords the individual a 
broad spectrum of protections and rights, current doctrine falls 
short with respect to the rights of linguistic minorities. Constitu-
tional discourse regarding minority rights traditionally relies on an 
analysis focused on certain categories of fundamental rights and 
tiers of scrutiny. Although these categories are not inherently nar-
row, they have been applied restrictively and mechanically to claims 
by linguistic minorities. Courts often look to see if the right at stake 
is included on the "list" and, if not, to deny protection. In the United 
States, a number of jurisdictions have enacted legislation restricting 
language rights of minority groups, making this issue increasingly 
important. 
International human rights law, by contrast, offers a more en-
lightened and flexible approach to adjudicating these issues. Unlike 
United States constitutional law, international human rights instru-
ments recognize language as a fundamental right. The international 
standards acknowledge the extent to which language allows linguis-
tic minorities to preserve their heritage, to maintain their identity, 
to educate themselves and ultimately to contribute to society. Ade-
quate doctrines, although far from perfect, have been developed 
103 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 58, Article 15. 
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by the international community to address linguistic minority issues. 
Through ratification of international instruments, through incor-
poration of these instruments by U.S. courts as customary law and 
through application of the principles embraced in the instruments, 
the United States has an opportunity to employ these doctrines for 
the greater protection of linguistic minorities. 
